Differences of Opinion on the Construction of Europe Compiled by the editorial office on the basis of declarations by the respective statesmen published recently in Archiv der Gegenwart
1. France
General Charles de Gaulle wants a Europe of states (governments) and no integrated supranational Europe, which he characterizes as a myth and a fiction. He wants the states (governments) to have the deciding vote, also in economic matters, and not the supranational authorities of the European Communities, such as the EEC Commission. He is opposed to majority decisions by the European Council of Ministers in all questions that are significant from a national or international perspective, because neither France nor any other country is prepared to do anything it believes is bad or wrong on command. He emphasizes that an integrated Europe would require a federator, which is presently lacking, with the necessary power, reputation, and resonance for the project, and he warns that an integrated Europe would not develop any of its own policies as a result of majority decisions and might therefore comply with an external federator who is not European (USA) out of weakness. He is willing to allow the European parliament the right to discuss even political issues but not to pass laws that would be binding for the European states. De Gaulle is not pleased that Britain is applying for membership in the EEC, since he is concerned that that country could challenge his leading role in the European Union, especially since Britain has a huge head start in the nuclear field, in part because of U.S. information to which de Gaulle is denied access. He also fears that, for the benefit of the Commonwealth countries, Britain might challenge, especially in Africa, the advantages (i.e., bonds from the EEC development fund) enjoyed by the twelve African republics that were previously French possessions and are now associated with the EEC. He is committed to tying the French Army – which, in the Algerian crisis, ran the risk of being forced into a position opposing the state – closer to the nation, to having it stationed largely on French soil, and to letting France’s defense become a national defense again. De Gaulle maintains his resolve to build up France’s own power to act as a nuclear deterrent. As long as the United States had a clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, he believed it was justified that France practically gave the United States responsibility for its defense. At that time, it could still be thought certain that any communist aggression in Europe could be destroyed by a nuclear response from the United States. In view of the present nuclear stalemate between the two giants and their mutual knowledge that each could destroy the other, de Gaulle thinks that no one can know in advance if, when, and under what circumstances the United States would decide for a nuclear response and thereby accept the risk of suicide. This is also one reason why de Gaulle would like to see Europe as a Third Power between the two superpowers, one that would raise its voice in the world and – furnished with the necessary clout – make itself heard effectively. In this sense, de Gaulle hopes for a reform of NATO; he feels this is fundamentally necessary and is willing to meet the attendant obligations. He would like this reform to include: giving the European states a say regarding the organization and deployment of U.S. nuclear deterrents within the scope of NATO, the expansion of NATO to Africa and Asia, and the creation of some sort of three-member directorate to discuss global issues through regular meetings of the heads of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Regarding the Berlin Question, de Gaulle is opposed to any departure from the Four Powers Agreements of the occupation regime. He is tolerating the so-called Berlin exploratory talks that the United States, on its own authority, is conducting with the Soviet Union. He explains that France wants nothing to do with them and stresses that he considers such talks not only pointless but also dangerous. In his view, the Berlin problem and the Berlin chicaneries staged by the Soviet Union only serve the Soviet Union as a suitable – that is, crucial – point of departure for bringing up the entire Germany problem in its own interest. Every concession made to the USSR in the Berlin Question would therefore lead only to new chicanery and pressures under worsened conditions for the West. Regarding the German Question, de Gaulle supports maintaining the status quo at the present time in view of the precarious balance between East and West, since any talks come at the risk of a setback for the West and because any hope of uniting Europe depends on solidarity between Germany and France, as does the fate of Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. By creating an attractive Western Europe, this solidarity could help establish a European balance with the states of the East, especially if the totalitarian regime there would abandon its ambitions at the same time. Only then would it be possible to solve the German problem objectively.
[ . . . ]
print version
return
to document list
previous document